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China has developed increasingly close economic relations with Africa in its quest for oil and 
minerals through investment and aid.  The World Bank recently called upon China to 
transplant labor-intensive factories onto the continent.  A question arises as to whether such 
an industrial relocation will be done in such a fashion to jump-start local economic 
development—as previously seen across East Asia and as described in the flying-geese (FG) 
paradigm of FDI.1  
  
Many studies have examined China’s—and other countries’—investments in Africa’s light 
industries (notably leather goods and textiles) and pointed out a host of difficulties they face 
because of poor local institutional conditions.2  Hence, this Perspective evaluates mostly 
China-side factors that may decisively induce a transmigration of labor-intensive factories, 
specifically to the sub-Saharan region.         
 
Judging from Asia’s FG model, three factors are the crucial inducements for FDI in low-end 
manufacturing: (i) labor costs, (ii) exchange rates and (iii) institutions. 
 
Labor costs  
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Successful catch-up growth necessarily leads to a rapid rise in wages, rendering   labor-
intensive exports uncompetitive. But how fast wages rise depends on the size of rural labor 
reserves that need to be shifted to industry.  In this respect, unlike Japan and the newly 
industrialized economies (NIEs) that had a relatively limited reserve of rural labor because of 
their small geographical size, China has a massive rural labor force yet to be tapped. 750 
million people still live in China’s countryside with the average rural income only one third 
of its urban counterpart.  Nevertheless, the recent labor unrest and the sharp wage hikes in the 
coastal provinces will prompt a shift of factory jobs elsewhere.  Here, China’s present 
income-doubling plan (by 2020) for its rural regions will promote intra-country industrial 
migration. Thus, China’s own vast interior seems more attractive as new production sites 
than any faraway countries.  
 
Exchange rates 
Currency appreciation in effect “taxes” exports but “subsidizes” outward FDI and imports.  
Japan and the NIEs submitted to swift and sharp rises in their currencies as they succeeded in 
catch-up growth. True, the yuan has considerably appreciated over recent years – but only 
slowly and not drastically enough to trigger a massive relocation of labor-intensive 
manufacturing overseas—largely because China is not quite ready to dismantle labor-
intensive industries that still provide much-needed jobs at home.  This gradual pace of 
appreciation gives exporters more time to raise productivity or to relocate inland, thereby 
allowing them to hang on a while.     
 
Institutions 
Institutional factors weigh on both sides.  Infrastructural deficiencies (e.g., unreliable power 
and water supply, transportation, communication, poor governance, inhospitable regulatory 
environments, work ethic) in Africa are well known.  This explains why foreign 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) in general, let alone China’s, have not yet seriously 
advanced into the continent in search of low-cost labor. The governments of the Asian NIEs 
quickly realized the potential of Japanese and Western FDI and thus were prepared to provide 
relevant infrastructure, particularly special economic zones (SEZs).   
  
Since 2006, as part of its strategy to assist sub-Saharan Africa in attracting manufacturing, 
China has been helping establish SEZs, a scheme modeled on its own SEZs. Currently, the 
Chinese SEZ in Zambia serves as a model for such zones in Africa. At the moment, 
nevertheless, there exists China’s tendency toward ethnicity-bound groupism, as evidenced in 
the employment of Chinese construction workers in large numbers for aid projects, the 
settlement of Chinese migrants and petty merchants/caterers in host countries and the one-
sided presence of Chinese consortia for overseas investments without much participation of 
local and other countries’ MNEs. 
 
In contrast, Asia’s SEZs succeeded in hosting not only foreign MNEs but many local firms as 
well, and host governments took proactive measures to use their SEZs as a learning conduit 
for modern technology and advanced business practices, a situation not yet commonly 
observable in sub-Saharan Africa. Lest China-sponsored SEZs that are presently in the early 
stages of development turn into “industrial Chinese diasporas,” so to speak, they would need 
multi-national participation, especially by African manufacturers themselves. South African 
MNEs, in particular, ought to participate in such zones.  Recently, the International Finance 
Corporation decided to fund $10 million as a joint financier of a commercial complex project 
(worth about $33 million) in Tanzania with a Chinese company and a local non-profit 
organization, inviting a third party to fund an additional $6.5 million3—an arrangement 
designed to encourage multi-national participation and adherence to internationally 
acceptable social and environmental standards. In addition, the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) - OECD Africa Investment Initiative aims to strengthen the capacity 
of African countries to design and implement reforms that improve their business climate and 
to unlock investment potential in the continent.  Also, the U.S.’s African Growth and 




All in all, even though China may be serious about relocating low-cost factories to sub-
Saharan Africa, there are hurdles to clear on both sides.  In the near term, China still can 
relocate labor-intensive manufacturing inland or to its low-cost neighbors, and sub-Saharan 
Africa itself is institutionally not quite ready to host labor-seeking FDI on a scale substantial 
enough to spark catch-up industrialization, flying-geese style, as has happened in Asia.  
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